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How can architecture, a discipline so tightly inter-
twined with money, resist neoliberalism? Is architec-
ture inevitably consigned, with Tafuri or Aureli, to 
a stoic or eremitic resignation? Or, with Sorkin, to a 
series of disconnected tactics? This paper takes a hint 
from Fredric Jameson to suggest that Deleuze and 
Guattari’s positive transformation of Marx’s quintes-
sentially capitalist notion of surplus value can allow 
us to rewrite the ontology (and epistemology) of ar-
chitecture as a differential and multiple reticulation. 
Architecture conjugates all sorts of things (“flows”, in 
the terminology used here) to create a surplus value 
beyond (or before) the capitalist surplus value that 
is only one negative instance of a broader positive 
phenomenon. This non-essentialist and non-formalist 
idea of architecture allows us to respond to Spencer’s 
criticism of the neoliberal “architectural Deleuzism”, 
and shows how effective political action is entirely 
feasible within the broad discipline of architecture.
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Neoliberalism and architecture
Fredric Jameson, in his 1982 lecture ‘Architecture 
and the Critique of Ideology,’ juxtaposes Manfredo 
Tafuri’s Marxist critique in Theories and History of 
Architecture and Architecture and Utopia with the 
postmodernism of Venturi, Scott Brown and Izenour’s 
Learning from Las Vegas, and comes to the following 
conclusion:
Is it possible that these two positions are in fact the same, 
and that as different as they may at first seem, both rest 
on the conviction that nothing new can be done, no funda-
mental changes can be made, within the massive being of 
late capitalism? What is different is that Tafuri’s thought 
lives this situation in a rigorous and self-conscious stoicism, 
whereas the practitioners and ideologues of postmodernism 
relax within it... (Jameson, 1986: 461)
For Tafuri, architecture inevitably operates with-
in the hegemony of capitalism, and is necessarily 
intertwined with it in such intimate manner that 
there is no possibility of effective critique or political 
action from within architecture (however defined). 
As Jameson points out, this stance is predicated on 
the hope of a future total revolution that would be 
the dialectical counterpart and overthrowing of the 
similarly total scope of current capitalism. Until then, 
the political capacity of architecture is strictly limited, 
and for Tafuri ‘there can be no qualitative change 
in any element of the older capitalist system – as, 
for instance, in architecture or urbanism – without 
beforehand a total revolutionary and systemic trans-
formation’ (Jameson, 1986: 452). On the other hand, 
for Venturi et al, and postmodernism in general, this 
inevitable intertwining is taken as a positive possibil-
ity for a creativity that at once celebrates and enables 
the capitalist enterprise: ‘The commercial strip, the 
Las Vegas strip in particular – the example par excel-
lence – challenges the architect to take a positive, non-
chip-on-the-shoulder view. Architects are out of the 
habit of looking nonjudgmentally at the environment, 
because orthodox Modern architecture is progres-
sive...’ (Venturi, Brown, Izenou, 1977: 3).
More recently, Douglas Spencer, who makes reference 
to Jameson’s article, essays the same ground (Spencer, 
2011). Although the personalities are different, the 
99Tim Gough
possibilities are similar, but pushed to extremes. The 
total scope of capitalism has been confirmed, beyond 
the dreams of either its 1980s adherents or critics: 
the neoliberalism ushered in by Augusto Pinochet’s 
Chile and Margaret Thatcher’s UK has achieved 
global scope, be it in the guise of totalitarian capi-
talism, ‘democratic’ capitalism or (with Trump and 
Putin) oligarchic capitalism. With this, architectural 
resistance appears all the less possible. Spencer’s 
unenthusiastic references to Brutalism and Modern-
ism reiterate Tafuri’s scepticism and posits no clear 
strategy for a contemporary architecture of capitalist 
opposition (Spencer, 2014: 88). The place of architec-
tural postmodernism has been taken by an architec-
ture that more effectively reflects neoliberalism, again 
well-essayed by Spencer. These include Alejandro 
Zaera-Polo, who, as Spencer puts it, thinks it ‘probably 
best not to speak any longer of large totalities such as 
capitalism or society’ (Spencer, 2014: 83; Zaera-Polo, 
2008: 101); or Patrik Schumacher, who sees ‘no better 
site for a progressive and forward-looking project 
than the most competitive contemporary business’ 
(Schumacher, 2005: 79). Schumacher here redefines 
the terms of the debate in order to emasculate any 
attempt at social criticality in architectural discourse 
or avant-garde design. As Venturi et al. noted in the 
quotation above, in the 1980s the term ‘progressive’ 
architecture invoked a socially aware and left-orien-
tated practice; for Schumacher, this meaning of the 
term must be ruled out, and the word appropriated by 
the discourse of neoliberalism. In the 1980s Ventu-
ri and Scott Brown did at least keep one eye on the 
question of social engagement, and felt it necessary 
to make a slightly apologetic reference in the second 
revised edition of Learning from Las Vegas to Scott 
Brown’s article ‘On Architectural Formalism and 
Social Concern: a Discourse for Social Planners and 
Radical Chic Architects’. One finds little sign of such 
scruples in today’s putative architectural avant-garde.
In the face of these two alternatives – the resignation 
of Tafuri or the acceptance of Venturi, Scott Brown, 
Zarea-Polo and Schumacher – Jameson briefly sug-
gests another oppositional route via Antonio Grams-
ci’s strategy of zones of culture resistance to capitalist 
hegemony – a ‘war of position’ and tactics rather than 
the decisive and strategic Leninist ‘war of manoeu-
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vre’ (Gramsci, 1992: 217-219). This “war of position” 
needs to be distinguished from one of Gramsci’s other 
key ideas of “passive revolution”, which refers to the 
ways in which the bourgeois effect non-revolutionary 
transformations in order to secure their dominant 
position (Callinicos, 2010). It is the task of the prop-
erly progressive architect to make counter-proposals 
within their local situation, some situation which they 
make ‘other’ to the situation of capitalism: ‘the very 
existence of such an ensemble in some other space 
of the world creates a new force field which cannot 
but have its influence’ (Jameson, 1986: 455). Such a 
situation, for Jameson, might in involve the construc-
tion of buildings (he cites Stalinallee in East Berlin) 
or it might involve Utopian proposals or architectural 
ideas (Jameson, 1986: 454). Jameson does not develop 
this thought in any detail, but it is possible to see how 
architecture might operate at this molecular level and 
how, therefore, architects can take action. Douglas 
Spencer’s writing is already an example of this at 
the level of ideas, and not the only one. Elsewhere, 
although the educational apparatus of architecture is 
being ever more closely integrated with neoliberalism 
and the production of what Maurizio Lazzarato has 
called ‘indebted man’ (Lazzarato, 2012) via student 
loan systems in the States and the UK, it is probably 
still possible to introduce pedagogic projects which 
propose some level of political engagement or ques-
tioning of the system under which they operate via 
proposals which undercut capitalist assumptions, per-
haps in addressing the marginalised and the precariat 
in ways which do not subsume them into this same 
debt machine. In these locations, as elsewhere, what 
must be fought against is the tendency of capitalism 
to play the ‘truth game’ of naturalising its position by 
establishing what Roberto Mangabeira Unger long ago 
termed the ‘False Necessity’ of neoliberalism. What 
is needed, he posits, is an anti-necessitarian social 
theory (to paraphrase the title of one of his books): we 
must not give in ‘to the ideas and attitudes that make 
the established order seem natural, necessary or au-
thoritative’ (Unger, 2004: xx).
For Pier Vittorio Aureli, by contrast, the possibility of 
resistance is related to ‘The Possibility of an Absolute 
Architecture’ of the archipelago, and operates not 
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al form, which for Aureli represents the reality of 
architecture properly defined. The task of the archi-
tect is to ‘confront the forces of urbanization’; Aureli 
uses this term ‘urbanization’ to name the closed 
organisational logic of capitalism. This confrontation 
is achieved by ‘opposing to urbanization’s ubiqui-
tous power their [the archipelagos’] explicitness as 
forms, as punctual, circumscribed facts, as stoppages’ 
(Aureli, 2001: xii). Aureli looks at Palladio, Piranesi, 
Boullée and Ungers – the last being the source of the 
notion of the architectural archipelago – and shows in 
each case ‘how the project of a specific architectural 
form is at once an act of radical autonomy from and 
radical engagement with the forces that characterized 
the urbanization of cities’ (Aureli, 2011: xii). Here is 
posited – and we can see it clearly in Aureli’s beautiful 
drawn architecture too – the possibility of resistance 
within constructed architecture itself (as Jameson saw 
in the Stalinallee). But we can immediately anticipate 
an objection to this: is not the reduction of architec-
ture and its possibilities of resistance to questions of 
architectural form precisely that – a reduction to a 
limited area of concern which disturbs neoliberalism 
not one bit. In contrast to Zaera-Polo or Schumacher, 
architectural form can for Aureli become a resistance 
to organisation rather than a celebration of it, but at 
the cost of shrinking its ambition. This tendency is 
taken to its logical conclusion in Aureli’s idea of an 
essentially eremitic architectural practice, a practice 
withdrawn from the world into a notional hermit’s 
cell, inspired, as Spencer shows, by Franciscan mo-
nastic life (Aureli, 2013; Spencer, 2017). This rep-
resents the end-point of Tafuri’s stoicism: if there is no 
effective architectural resistance to be found against 
the capitalist hegemon, then a withdrawal into the 
monastic cell, and the production of an architecture of 
pure form, is perhaps the most honest and realistic of 
responses.
Michael Sorkin makes arguments, largely of a 
 Jameson/Gramscian type, in the afterword to Peggy 
Deamer’s Architecture and Capitalism. Noting that ‘the 
inevitable nexus of architecture and capital is one of 
its core fascinations’, he goes on to outline nine pos-
sible tactics for how architecture might ‘live without 
capitalism’. He begins, pace Aureli, by dismissing the 
possibility that architectural form might do the job: 
Is not the reduction 
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‘Architectural form has completely lost its power to be 
dangerous and only its absence – or violent destruc-
tion – threatens anyone’ (Sorkin, 2017: 217-220). What 
might do the job are respectively: the political demand 
for redistribution; a Ghandhian refusal to play ball; 
a celebration of the informal not as a ‘state of excep-
tion’ but rather, with Ananya Roy (2005), as an idiom 
practised outside the hegemony of neoliberalism; the 
demand for a space of occupation; a newly reawak-
ened tactic of the flaneur; a celebration of the body’s 
corporeality and the possibilities of the visionary; a 
return to socialism, a demand for a larger state; and 
finally – tongue-in-cheek – a becoming pure mind, de-
feating property by means of a digital future. This list 
of possibilities should not be dismissed, and indeed 
as a series of political manoeuvres some of them have 
the potential for effectiveness, or failing that repre-
sent at least a call to moral action. However, in respect 
of whatever specificity we may assign to architecture, 
Sorkin’s list seems to fall short. In what way are these 
tactics architectural in intent? For sure, the architect 
can deploy them, but what is architecture such that 
this deployment would form a part of the discipline or 
the phenomena of it?
We perhaps therefore need to be more specific about 
what is meant by architecture. Are we referring to the 
academic discipline? the politics of space? the archi-
tectural profession? a building? a set of buildings? Or 
the creation or production of these things?
Surplus value
Returning to Jameson and Spencer, there is a hint 
in their work as to how architecture and capital-
ism might be characterised through the work of 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. In a long footnote, 
Jameson picks up on the possibilities of their con-
cept of the rhizome outlined in A Thousand Plateaus, 
published two years before Jameson’s lecture. In 
Spencer, Deleuze is framed as a missed, or misused, 
opportunity: he pejoratively gives the work of Schum-
acher, Zaera-Polo and others the name ‘Architectural 
Deleuzism’ (reworking a term from Ian Buchanan, 
2000). This is not entirely to dismiss the philosophy of 
Deleuze, but rather to show how it has been misused 
in the name of a formalism of flow – ‘the smoothed 
forms and undulating surfaces that characterise the 
In what way 
are these tactics 
architectural in 
intent? For sure, 
the architect can 
deploy them, but 
what is architecture 
such that this 
deployment would 
form a part of the 
discipline or the 
phenomena of it?
103Tim Gough
projects of practices such as Reiser + Umemoto, [Lars] 
Spuybroek’s NOX or Ali Rahim and Hina Jamelle’s 
Contemporary Architecture Practice’ (Spencer, 2014: 
88). The reduction of architecture, and specifically a 
putative avant-garde architecture, to the question of 
form is, for Spencer, a sub-set of the generalised polit-
ical move to extirpate the left-wing politics from the 
work of Deleuze and Guattari. In this he sees Manuel 
De Landa’s de-politicised interpretation as being par-
ticularly pertinent to architectural debate, given the 
influence De Landa has had on the aforementioned 
formalist reception of Deleuze in architectural theory 
and practice. Spencer notes that De Landa effects a 
consistent de-Marxification of Deleuze (Spencer, 2014: 
92), and points us to Eliot Albert who succinctly states 
that ‘De Landa’s misreading of Marx thus becomes... a 
grotesque misrepresentation of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
work’ (Albert, 1998). This de-politicised Deleuzian 
strain of architectural theory was perhaps most effec-
tively promoted by Sanford Kwinter, whose seminal 
Architectures of Time cast Deleuze as a scientistic for-
malist whose interest in, for instance, the political and 
minoritarian side of Kafka was merely a result of the 
supposedly baleful (i.e. political) influence of Guattari 
(Kwinter, 2001: 115). By contrast, Albert points us back 
to Jameson who, he notes, states that ‘Deleuze is alone 
among the great thinkers of so-called poststructur-
alism in having accorded Marx an absolutely funda-
mental role in his philosophy’ (Jameson, 1997: 395).
For Jameson, the positive quality of Deleuze and Guat-
tari’s Capitalism and Schizophrenia (the overall name 
for the two volumes comprised of Anti-Oediopus and 
A Thousand Plateaus) is the way it maintains Marx-
ism as a problematic. Daniel W. Smith argues that the 
whole of Deleuze’s work (in contrast to that of, say, 
Alain Badiou) is ‘problematic’ (Smith, 2003), and it is 
within this problematic that he and Guattari give their 
definitive characterisation of capitalism, and with it 
neoliberalism, as a politics of flow:
Decoded flows – but who will give a name to this new desire? 
Flows of property that is sold, flows of money that circulates, 
flows of production and means of production making ready 
in the shadows, flows of workers becoming deterritorial-
ized: the encounter of all these flows will be necessary, their 
conjunction, and their reaction on one another – and the 
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contingent nature of this encounter, this conjunction, and 
this reaction, which occur one time – in order for capitalism 
to be born... (Deleuze, Guattari, 1983: 223-224)
What is a ‘decoded flow’? They later state:
At the heart of Capital, Marx points to the encounter of two 
‘principal’ elements: on one side, the deterritorialized work-
er who has become free and naked, having to sell his labor 
capacity; and on the other, decoded money that has become 
capital and is capable of buying it... (Deleuze, Guattari, 1983: 
225)
This is the Marxist heart of the ‘decoding’ of capital-
ism. The status of the worker is decoded such that she 
loses all value and meaning, aside from that of pure 
labour to be utilised. The status of money is decod-
ed into capital and freed, again, from meaning – a 
process which continued with the increasing abstrac-
tion of money through the development of capitalism 
into neoliberalism. What gets this whole concept of 
flows going is the main idea of Marxism, the notion 
of surplus value, which Marx deals with in Part Three 
of Capital entitled ‘Production of Absolute Surplus 
Value’ (Marx, 1930: 171-322). The capitalist is the one 
who extracts a surplus value from the use-value of 
the worker’s productive capabilities. The value to the 
capitalist, making use of the worker, of the worker’s 
time is greater than what it costs him, and therefore 
there is an exploitative production of surplus value, 
a process of ‘creating value’ (Marx, 1930: 193). In 
creating this additional value money is transformed 
into capital: ‘the trick [of capitalism] has at last been 
successful, money has been changed into capital’ 
(Marx, 1930: 189), and in volume two of Capital Marx 
shows how this surplus value moves onwards through 
the system of the circuits of money capital, productive 
capital and commodity capital (Marx, 1978: 109-196)
Eliot Albert points us to a key quotation, at the begin-
ning of Anti-Oedipus – Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 
in relation to surplus value (Albert, 1998), where 
Deleuze and Guattari state the following:
In a chain that mixes together phonemes, morphemes, etc., 
without combining them, papa’s mustache, mama’s upraised 
arm, a ribbon, a little girl, a cop, a shoe suddenly turn up. 
Each chain captures fragments of other chains from which it 
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‘extracts’ a surplus value, just as the orchid code ‘attracts’ the 
figure of a wasp: both phenomena demonstrate the surplus 
value of a code.... If this constitutes a system of writing, it is a 
writing inscribed on the very surface of the Real.... (Deleuze, 
Guattari, 1983: 39)
It is evident from this passage that Deleuze and 
Guattari both generalise the concept of surplus value, 
and make it positive, as part of what Alberto Toscano 
has called “in the great operation done on Marx in 
the first chapter of the Anti-Oedipus” (Toscano et al., 
1999: 125). This means that the underlying abstract 
workings that allow capitalism to be effective can be 
assessed positively. There is always a Nietzschean 
undercurrent to Deleuze, an avoidance of all ressen-
timent, as outlined in his early book Nietzsche and 
Philosophy. He is suspicious of the depreciation of life, 
of the Real: ‘For the speculative element of negation, 
opposition or contradiction Nietzsche substitutes the 
practical element of difference, the object of affir-
mation and enjoyment’ (Deleuze, 1983: 9). Deleuze 
and Guattari’s insight is to understand that, if Marx’s 
notion of surplus value is critical to an understand-
ing of and the reality of capitalism, then this notion 
must perforce have a general positive import from 
which the specific negative phenomenon that Marx 
highlights must derive. I say ‘perforce’, in the sense 
that this is a question of forcing, a question of a choice 
that Deleuze and Guattari make, a bias they have or 
a Spinozian prejudice for the positive that is evident 
throughout their work and that comes into play in 
a number of locations – for instance, in relation to 
the interpretation of Foucault where Deleuze will 
transform and positivise Foucault’s notion of power 
by saying that it ‘produces reality before it represses’ 
(Deleuze, 1988: 25).
Thus it is always necessary, for Deleuze and Guattari, 
to delve below the negative and critical positions of a 
Foucault or a Marx – to delve beneath the Foucauld-
ian concept of ‘power’ as essentially repressive and 
beneath the concept of ‘surplus value’ as essentially 
capitalist. Jameson noted a change in valence between 
Tafuri’s negative stoicism and the postmodernist’s 
positive taking up of capitalist themes. There is a 
similar change here, not to support the capitalist he-
gemon but rather the opposite. This change in valence 
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is undertaken not merely because in this philosophy 
all essentialism is to be deprecated, but more substan-
tially in order to find, with Nietzsche, the underlying 
non-essential positive flow that gives politics-as-re-
pression and capitalism their possibility. This flow is 
non-essential because it is differential; that is, it starts 
from the affirmation of difference(s) inherent in the 
relationships (or power or surplus value) prior to the 
selection of the positive terms of those relationships 
(the political subject or the worker and the capitalist). 
This is why, as Deleuze and Guattari state vis-à-vis 
Kafka, ‘[c]riticism is completely useless’ (Deleuze, 
Guattari, 1986: 58). Marx and Foucault are critical 
(amongst other things), and that is necessary, but is 
only a preliminary step. It is preliminary because the 
moment of critique is reactionary: it remains on the 
same level as that which it wishes to attack. But the 
enemy, with Kafka, must be fought below (or above), 
on a different level. The call is to find the underlying, 
positive flow, the flow which has been hitched up 
to capitalism and to repressive politics; do not, our 
authors tell us, be satisfied with criticising that which 
makes use of it!
The transformation effected here by Deleuze and 
Guattari is that surplus value becomes ‘the surplus 
value of a code’. What does this mean? It is clear 
that this code has nothing to do with meaning. In 
this respect, Deleuze and Guattari’s concern is quite 
different to that of, say, Henri Lefebvre, whose The 
Production of Space locates the codes of space within 
a representational ontology entirely foreign to our 
authors’ concerns (Lefebvre, 1991: 1-67). For Deleuze 
and Guattari, what it has to do with are chains, 
multiplicities or flows that relate to each other and 
to other multiplicities or flows, interpreted within 
an avowedly non-representational philosophy. For 
example, the chain, multiplicity, or flow that makes 
up the orchid ‘attracts’ the flow that makes up the 
wasp. This gives surplus value, by the fact of synthe-
sis – of what they call the ‘great disjunctive synthesis’ 
(Deleuze, Guattari, 1983: 44). The orchid seduces 
the wasp, the wasp gains the pleasure of nectar, the 
orchid gains the possibility to reproduce, and sur-
plus value is thereby created. In this synthesis one of 
the flows interacts with other in ‘endlessly ramified 
paths’ (Deleuze, Guattari, 1983: 44). The paths are 
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ramified because the interplay of the wasp and the 
orchid constitutes for neither of them the total of their 
interplays; each has an indefinite number of other 
symbioses within which they play (the wasp with the 
air, with its co-workers, with its nest... the orchid with 
its leaves, its mycelia, the rain, the sun...). For Deleuze 
and Guattari, following Spinoza, these syntheses are 
nothing other than the Real, and this Real is a sort of 
writing, but not a writing with meaning or significa-
tion, but rather a writing that produces desire. That is, 
it produces difference or power, the milieu or element 
within which these syntheses occur and which are the 
‘object of affirmation and enjoyment’.
The negative Marxist surplus value of capital becomes 
here a subset of a more general reality of the surplus 
value of code. In turn, the notion of flow, which char-
acterises capitalism in its flows of labour, urbanity, 
property and money, is also shown to have a general 
ontological value as a ‘flow or a nonpersonal hylè’, 
an element or ether within which or on which things 
‘take’ as so many after-effects of difference.
It is this general ontology of flows which we should 
refer to in relating these thoughts about capitalism to 
the question of architecture and its possible response 
to capitalist flows. As noted in section one above, 
there is a general sense in which the ontology of 
architecture, within discussions about its relation to 
capitalism and elsewhere, remains unclarified and 
un-thought. The concepts of capitalism (flow and the 
creation of surplus value) are generalised by Deleuze 
and Guattari such that they can form the elements of 
a general ontology – or rather, the general ontology of 
flows outlined in Capitalism and Schizophrenia. This 
ontology does not derive from capitalism. Rather, 
capitalism is so successful precisely because it re-
sponds to and works with the Real, albeit in a nega-
tive way. Despite this capture, it is still possible – and 
necessary – to start from this general ontology of the 
Real and to ask, in that light: what is the ontology of 
architecture?
Architecture as flow and haecceity 
If architecture is a multiplicity, if it is itself flows, what 
differences, what syntheses or symbioses go to effec-
tuate it? We can take a clue from the wasp and the 
orchid, where two flows (each making up the individ-
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ual wasp and orchid) meet briefly to extract a surplus 
value of code. The flows which make up the individ-
uals which we can distinguish as architecture, in all 
its various meanings as profession, production and 
inhabited environment, are equally multiple. Archi-
tecture works with, and works over, economic flows, 
flows of material, flows of thought, flows of memory, 
flows of history, flows of technology, flows of concepts 
and ideas, and of course political flows. This list could 
be extended indefinitely, because it is derived not 
from any essentialist notion of what architecture is 
but rather from the empirical reality of architecture. 
(Recall that Deleuze calls himself, many times, an 
empiricist (Deleuze, Parnet, 2007: xii).) To compile 
and extend this list we need only ask: what is it that 
architects (be they academics, historians, designers 
or critics) and architecture as an entire and broad 
discipline do, what do they engage with, in reality, 
in the Real? The concerns of the empiricist, and the 
implications of an empirical philosophy, are in strong 
contrast to a tendency for architecture to define 
itself essentially. To give just a few examples of this 
essentialising thought: with Alberti, architecture is 
essentially ideational (Alberti, 1991: book eight); with 
Laugier, essentially shelter (Laugier, 1985); with Pevs-
ner, essentially an aesthetically considered building 
(Pevsner, 1957: 23); for Aureli and Kwinter, essentially 
form. Deleuze and Guattari, following Spinoza, have 
an entirely different strategy: they start not from the 
essence, but from the Real.
In addition, architecture always works with and 
works over flows of people and social flows – that is, 
it works with us, be we architects, critics, inhabitants, 
victims or philosophers. In Deleuze and Guattari’s 
terms, architecture is an ‘haecceity’. Traditionally, this 
word means something like the ‘thisness’ of a thing. 
Our authors give it a more specific meaning. In a 
beautiful passage, they state:
There is a mode of individuation very different from that of 
a person, subject, thing, or substance. We reserve the name 
haecceity for it. A season, a winter, a summer, an hour, a date 
have a perfect individuality lacking nothing, even though 
this individuality is different from that of a thing or a sub-
ject. They are haecceities in the sense that they consist en-
tirely of relations of movement and rest between molecules 
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or particles, capacities to affect and be affected. (Deleuze, 
Guattari, 1987: 261)
Architecture is just such a haecceity, or such an indi-
vidual. It is a mode of individuation utterly different 
from the solidity of a subject, object or substance. Ar-
chitecture, as flow, is something more like a summer, 
an hour, a particular date in which we are entwined 
and which almost pre-exists us, but allows us to 
come into being at the same time as we help create 
that very individuality of architecture. There are no 
pre-existing subjects and objects; these are after-ef-
fects, abstractions after the event. The subject – which 
is supposedly us – and the object – which is supposed-
ly architecture – are terms of a lesser ontology which 
does not stay true to the flowing reality of the world, 
and which therefore misrepresents the nature of the 
Real:
We must avoid an oversimplified conciliation, as though 
there were on the one hand formed subjects, of the thing or 
person type, and on the other hand spatiotemporal coor-
dinates of the haecceity type. For you will yield nothing to 
haecceities unless you realize that that is what you are, and 
that you are nothing but that. (Deleuze, Guattari, 1987: 262)
But how do flows become haecceities? If architecture 
is somehow made up of economic, political, material, 
thoughtful, historic, memorable and social flows, and 
then in turn flows with us or with you, what makes 
up the solidity of architecture? But this is to put the 
question in the wrong way. There is no solidity of 
architecture – neither a formal solidity, nor a material 
one, nor indeed a political or economic one. Deleuze 
and Guattari do not ask us to create solid elements out 
of flows; rather their cry is more straightforward and 
more realistic: ‘conjugate the flows’ (Deleuze, Guat-
tari, 1987: 11). In other words, create surplus value by 
linking the flows into an haecceity – a haecceity ‘that 
is what you are’ – by precipitating out from the flows 
a particular, constructive individuality, but without 
imputing to this individual a stasis or a solidity. Ar-
chitecture is too often seduced by the building, by the 
phenomenal solidity of the objects which it suppos-
edly creates, as if this solidity is an essentially posi-
tive quality in itself that should therefore determine 
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the ontology – the mode of being – of architecture. 
Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy of flow, of becom-
ing, presents the most cogent refutation of this view.
What the architect should properly intend to create, 
therefore, is not a building, not a solidity, but this 
difference, this individual or haecceity or particular 
surplus value of architecture that consists of a syn-
thesis or conjunction, within which the subject and 
object are not pre-determined, and which takes into 
account the responsibility of architecture to engage 
with a multitude of flows – including the political and 
economic ones which seem dominated by capital-
ism. By doing this, by undercutting the formation of 
subjects and objects and creating a space for some-
thing other than these pre-formed vessels into which 
capitalism, above all, pours us, an adequate response 
to the neoliberal hegemony might be essayed. The 
counter-argument to the eremitic formalism of Aureli 
or de-politicised architectural ‘Deleuzism’ starts from 
a re-politicisation of the discipline and fact of archi-
tecture. It also starts from an engagement with eco-
nomics, be that the economics of a building project, 
the broader economics of the distribution of assets 
(such as housing) within society, or the economics of 
the marginalised, the immigrant or the ‘citizen of the 
world’. The conjugation of flows that occurs in and 
as architecture includes politics, just as it includes 
economic questions or poetic ones; it cuts across 
the established strata or habits into which thought 
is commonly solidified, which is in itself a political 
question – a question of how these habits and strata 
are policed and kept in their place, particularly but 
not only within the academy. Likewise, the counter-ar-
gument to Tafuri’s stoicism rests in understanding pol-
itics, and particularly the hegemonic quality of cap-
italism and neoliberalism, not as a solid body of fact 
which cannot be gotten around, but as mutable flows 
which can be redirected and whose quality as flow 
interacting with other flows is made explicit (Deleuze, 
Guattari, 1986: 47). If the haecceity of architecture 
inevitably interplays with the flow of money, this does 
not rule out political action on any number of fronts, 
by engaging and conjugating other flows that call into 
question the overarching power and ‘necessity’ of 
capitalism. In one sense this is a policy (with Sorkin) 
of tactics. His list of anti-capitalist possibilities cited in 
The counter-
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section one should be reframed; they are not a series 
of isolated tactical positions, but rather need to be 
folded into an overall strategy of multiple flows which 
allows that political action can advance in many loca-
tions at once, hidden from the enemy whose reduc-
tion of reality to a single ‘truth game’ blinds them to 
the effectiveness of the other conjugated flows.
How therefore to act?
How might this operate in practice? A concrete 
example, amongst an indefinite number of possible 
examples, relating to those marginalised figures of 
capitalism whose position is nearly always, accord-
ing to essentialist notions of architecture, consigned 
to the periphery or exterior: does architecture, qua 
architecture, have a responsibility to the worker? For 
instance, to the worker’s safety on the building site? 
(Spencer gives a well-known example of this question 
in relation to Zaha Hadid architects. Spencer, 2016: 
73.) Or their economic situation? The answer depends 
on your underlying ontology of architecture. For 
William Morris, a Marxist for whom the interrelation 
(following Ruskin) of the worker with the work of 
architecture was a key architectural (as well as polit-
ical and moral) issue, the answer was unequivocal: 
architecture cannot be great architecture unless such 
things are taken into consideration. But the current 
hyper-competitive and neo-Darwinist ideology of 
neoliberalism posits, in necessitarian manner, that the 
conditions of the worker are a supposedly natural out-
come of the economic forces which traverse and make 
up the workplace. To point to the conjunction of real 
flows which create the situation of exploited labour; 
to take the stance, be it in an academic piece of writ-
ing, in an architect’s office, in a meeting with a client, 
or indeed in a press release, that this exploitation is 
not an inevitable outcome; to promote a difference 
that makes a difference: these are real political and 
moral acts that will have an effect, whether or not ar-
chitects are required by law to consider such matters, 
and whether or not it is fashionable to do so.
If, with Morris, there can be no great architecture 
without consideration of the flow of labour, I wish to 
conclude by returning to Aureli, for whom there is no 
great architecture without the autonomy of form. It 
is difficult to imagine two further extremes of archi-
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tectural thought: labour, and form. But these are not 
two opposed concepts of architecture. Rather, they 
are two of the indefinite number of flows which make 
it up. The consideration of form, and the making-au-
tonomous of form, is surely as much one of the flows 
which characterises the Real of architecture as the 
flow of labour. It is simply, if we are to take Deleuze 
and Guattari and the ontology of flows seriously, 
that this autonomy of form must not be solidified 
into what is essential to architecture. Neither must 
anything else. There is no essence of architecture: this 
is what the surplus value of flow tells us, which far 
from consigning us to the ineffectual gives us the very 
possibility of action on the Real.
Jameson is therefore not wrong in the final para-
graph of ‘Architecture and the Critique of Ideology’, 
where he returns to the idea of a ‘properly Gramscian 
architecture’ waging a ‘gradualist’ war of position 
rather than a revolutionary overturning of the entire 
‘massive being’ of capitalism. Except that within an 
understanding of architecture as the individuation of 
flows, we do not reduce effective political action to the 
negative status of the ‘gradual’ but rather acknowl-
edge the positive possibility that all action occurs 
within and amongst multiplicities. There is in reality 
no massive being of capitalism, if by that is implied 
a solid block that must be gradually hacked away, or 
destroyed in one act of revolution. Certainly, there is 
a massive effectiveness of capitalism, but this derives 
not from its solidity but from its ability to harness 
flows for the creation of surplus value. But we will 
not block such flows, neither within architecture nor 
outside it, by means of solid or essentialist ontologies: 
instead, we are called by this philosophy to acknowl-
edge the effectiveness of flows and to conjugate them 
in a manner which calls into question the false neces-
sity and the operation of capitalism. This is not a grad-
ualist capitulation, but rather a harnessing, to better 
effect, of the underlying flows from which capitalism 
draws it strength.
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